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RIPARIAN RIGHTS REVISITED: LEGAL BASIS
FOR FEDERAL INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS
WALTER KIECHEL, JR.* and MARTIN GREEN**

That a gurgling stream, from whose shady depths occasionally a
silver fish flashes and a variety of indistinct furry heads take furtive
sips is not an integral part of the forest through which it winds, is a
thought which would never occur to a poet, a small boy, or a federal
bureaucrat. It is a thought, however, which has occurred to many
State water administrators, who, in a number of lawsuits currently
pending,' contend that the establishment of a national forest does
not necessarily confer upon the federal government the right to
maintain minimum stream flows for the purposes of preserving
aquatic life, sustaining forest fauna, and satisfying human needs for
sylvan brooks.
The argument in opposition to the state officials, if not the argument of the poet, or the child or then at least the argument of the
federal bureaucrat, is based on the reserved rights doctrine which the
2
Supreme Court, in its recent decision in Cappaert v. United States,
succinctly summarized:
...

when the Federal Government withdraws it land from the public

domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by
implication, reserves appurtenant water than unappropriated to the
extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In so
doing the United States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated
water which vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to
the rights of future appropriators. Reservation of water rights is

empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, which permits
federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Property Clause, Art.
IV, § 3, which permits federal regulation of federal lands. The doctrine applies to Indian reservations and other federal enclaves,
*Environmental Counsel, International Paper Company; formerly Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
**Legislative Assistant, Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of
Justice.
1. Soderman v. Kackley; Avondale Irrigation District v. North Idaho Properties, Inc.,
both now pending before the Idaho Supreme Court; Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v.
Salopek, Civil No. 6326 (6th N.M. J.D.); New Mexico ex rel S. E. Reynolds v. Molybdenum
Corp. of America (D. N.M.); In re the Application for Water Rights of the United States of
America, District Court (Colorado) in and for Water Division No. 4, W-425 through W-438.
2. 96 S.Ct. 2062 (June 7,1976).
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encompassing water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams.
ColoradoRiver Water ConservationDistrict v. United States, 96 U.S.
1236, [p. 41 (1976); United States v. District Courtfor Eagle Coun-

ty, 401 U.S. 520, 522-523 (1971); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 601 (1963); FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955); United
States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939); Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564 (1908).
At one time the very soundness of the reserved rights doctrine was
fiercely contested. It is a measure, perhaps, of how far that doctrine
has become ensconced in the law that the suits where minimum
stream flows are in issue today seem to turn, not on the naked power
of the federal government to reserve in-stream uses4 if it chooses to
do so, but rather on whether or not, in national forests at any rate, it
was the intention of the federal government to reserve such uses and
rights.'
This, however, is not the concession it appears to be, for it denies
that a reservation of lands by the government necessarily carries with
it a right to the continued natural flow of the streams on the land,
and rather makes the existence of this right dependent on the express
or implied intention of the government in creating the reservation.
But in many areas of the law rights exist not as a result of the
intentions of a party with respect to its activities, but by the operation of law upon those activities. This is especially true in the area of
real property, where the power of a grantor or testator, for example,
to create new types of interests in land, simply does not exist, despite the intentions of the grantor or testator in the matter.6 This
may be the case with respect to reserved rights. It is quite possible
that a necessary incident of the mere existence of a reserved right,
regardless of the presence or absence of any expression of intention
to that effect, is the right to the continued flow of such stream as
3. 96 S.Ct. 2062, 2069 (1976).
4. The use of water in a stream for no reason other than to maintain the stream, and the
ecology it supports, is frequently referred to as an in-stream use.
5. The contentions of the opponents of in-stream uses are based on language of the
Organic Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 35, which declares that no public forest reservation
shall be established "except to improve and protect the forest within the reservation, or for
the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States," (this portion
of the Organic Act is codified as 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1970)), and which also states that "all
waters on such reservations may be used for domestic, mining, milling, or irrigation purposes, under the laws of the States wherein such forest reservations are situated, or under
" (30 Stat. 36; 16 U.S.C. § 481 (1970)). On the basis of
the laws of the United States ..
these statutory directives, States and would-be appropriators contend that the use of water
merely to maintain the streams in national forests is not contemplated, and that, to the
contrary, all of the waters within a forest are subject to appropriation by private citizens.
6. 4 Thompson on Real Property § 1848 (1961 ed).
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may be upon the reserved land. To understand this, we must turn to
an analysis of the essential nature of the reserved right.
The reserved right can best be conceptualized if we go back in
time to the date of the acquisition by the Federal Government of its
western territories. Some of this land was acquired on April 30,
1803, by the Louisiana Purchase; other land was acquired in 1848,
by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and a little more in 1853, by
the Gadsden Purchase; most of the rest was acquired in 1846, by the
treaty with Great Britain which ceded the Oregon Territory to the
United States. These territories, after being acquired from various
sovereigns, became the absolute property and domain of the United
States, subject to the conditions the Federal Government accepted
relating to the rights of the people then inhabiting the territory. The
sovereignty of the United States Government over the territory was
complete.
The organization of territorial governments extended the English
Common Law over these areas." Thus, rights to the use of water
throughout these areas were, upon and subsequent to their acquisition by the United States, governed by the doctrine of riparian rights
as it had existed at common law. Riparian rights are numerous; the
specific riparian right of interest to this discussion is what Mr. Justice
Brewer, in United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company,8 referred to as "the unquestioned rule of the common
law ...that every riparian owner was entitled to- the continued
natural flow of the stream."
Of course, the United States, with respect to the lands owned by it
throughout the western territories, had a status at least equal to that
of any proprietor of private lands.9 Accordingly, those incidents of
riparian title which at common law pertained to lands in private
ownership, pertained also to land in federal ownership. The consequence is that the United States, in its western territories, fully as
much as any riparian owner in Massachussets or Pennsylvania, had
the right to receive the continued natural flow of the streams on its
land.
The arid conditions of the West, however, inspired a departure
from the common law rule, and in United States v. Rio Grande Dam
and Irrigation Company'0 Mr. Justice Brewer describes what
happened:
7. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 227 (1845); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 42, 62 (1890).
8. 174 U.S. 690, 702 (1898).
9. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897); United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U.S. 459,474 (1915); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954).

10. Supra note 8, at 704.
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Notwithstanding the unquestioned rule of the common law in
reference to the right of a lower riparian proprietor to insist upon
the continuous flow of the stream as it was, and although there has
been in all the Western States an adoption or recognition of the
common law, it was early developed in their history that the mining
industry in certain States, the reclamation of arid lands in others,
compelled a departure from the common law rule, and justified an
appropriation of flowing waters both for mining purposes and for
the reclamation of arid lands, and there has come to be recognized in
those States, by custom and by state legislation, a different rule-a
rule which permits, under certain circumstances, the appropriation
of the waters of a flowing stream for other than domestic purposes.' 1
While acknowledging that a state has the power of changing the
common law rule as to streams within its dominion, Mr. Justice
Brewer pointed out that two limitations on the state's power must be
recognized. The first is that,
in the absence of specific authority from Congress a State cannot by
its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of
lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so
far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property. 1 2
Mr. Justice Brewer then discussed Section 9 of the Act of July 26,
1866' ' and the Desert Land Act of March 3, 1877,' * both of which
recognized the system of water rights based upon appropriation
rather than the system of riparian ownership, and concluded, "Obviously, by these acts, so far as they extended, Congress recognized
and assented to the appropriation of water in contravention of the
common law rule as to continuous flow."' s
Well and good: the waters of the streams on the vast federal
domains subject to the Acts of July 26, 1866 and March 3, 1877
may be appropriated by private citizens "in contravention of the
common law rule as to continuous flow." This does not say that the
federal government has divested itself of its rights to continuous
flow, but rather, that others might secure appropriative rights "in
contravention of the common law rule as to continuous flow."
But what are the rights which the United States secures as a consequence of its setting aside land for a specific purpose? Obviously,
11. Id. at 704.

12. Id. at 703.
13. 14 Stat. 253 (1866).
14. Ch. 107 19 Stat. 377 (1877).
15. Supra note 8, at 706.

October 19761

RIPARIAN RIGHTS REVISITED

the United States acquires for itself, by the act of reserving land for a
governmental purpose, at least the riparian rights which had appertained to the land set aside, subject to such diminution in water
flows as may have occurred by the appropriation of water by others
prior to the reservation. In other words, the only pre-existing body
of water rights from which the United States can carve out and
reserve when it sets aside land for a specific use are the riparian rights
created by the common law upon its extension to the western territories.
That reserved rights are nothing other than riparian rights is amply
shown by the briefs filed by the government in Winters v. United
States. I6 In their original brief filed before the Supreme Court, government attorneys stated at page 12 that "the theory of the bill of
complaint is: ... that the doctrine of riparian rights prevails in
Montana," and in their supplemental brief filed with the Supreme
Court, government attorneys at page 17 stated their position to be
that
the United States by setting apart and holding this tract of land as an
Indian reservation thereby reserved it from the public domain and
exempted from subsequent adverse appropriation, under either the
public land laws of the United States or the laws and customs of
Montana, the uninterrupted flow of all water necessary to its beneficial use."
The government attorneys were thus expressly arguing that what was
reserved to the United States was a right which Mr. Justice Brewer,
and the authors of this brief who quoted extensively from his decision in the Rio Grande case, recognized to be a riparianright. The
Supreme Court, in the Winters decision, did not characterize the
reserved right there involved as a riparian right, and expressly noted
that it had not discussed the doctrine of riparian rights urged by the
government. Nevertheless the Court must necessarily be deemed to
have accepted the government's argument with respect to the source
of the right being reserved, for no other source was suggested by the
government, and the opposing side had argued at pages 95 and 130
of their brief that there were no rights remaining in the government
which could be reserved.
Now if, as seems clear, the right to the continued natural flow of
the stream is a riparian right which is secured to federal land upon its
16. 207 U.S. 564 (1908) this case established the existence of reserved water rights.
17. "Beneficial use" is not a term peculiar to appropriative water rights; it is frequently
used with respect to riparian water rights: see Elliott v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 10 Cush.
141,197 (Mass., 1852).
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being reserved for a special purpose, then it follows that we need not
look to the purpose for the reservation of the land-that is, the
intention of the government-to ascertain whether there was in fact a
reservation of the flow of the water. The reservation of the flow of
the water is an inevitable incident of the reservation of the land. The
purpose of the reservation of the land, or the intention of the government, is pertinent in a water adjudication proceeding, if at all, in
determining the quantity of water which, under applicable principles
of law, may be necessary to satisfy the water flow right. But the
existence of the right to the continued natural flow of the streamthe right to maintain the physical existence of the stream as a
stream-can not be doubted.
Applying this conclusion to the problem to which we initially
addressed ourselves, we find that there is no room to argue whether
or not the creation of a national forest carries with it the reservation
of enough water to keep the streams in the forest physically in
existence. As a matter of law, the creation of any federal reservation
automatically establishes in the federal government the right to the
continued natural flow of the streams within the reservation, and the
right to use this water as the needs of the reservation require. The
only question which can exist is what quantity of water is necessary
to keep the streams flowing and to meet the needs of the reservation.
If, as in the case of national forests, the law provides that all waters
within the boundaries of the reservation may be used for domestic,
mining, milling, or irrigation purposes, then what clearly must be
meant is that only the waters in excess of those needed to keep the
streams flowing, and the forest viable, may be so used, the volume of
such water being, in each case, a factual question.' 8
It would thus seem that here, as in so many other areas, the law
has the good sense to follow nature. Just as in nature a forest inevitably brings with it a network of rivulets, streams, and rivers, and
an associated community of fish, birds, animals and insects, so does
the law assume, and establish, that the national government, in
creating forest reservations, necessarily also protects and preserves the
forest streams which engender and nourish the flora and fauna inseparably linked with the forests we walked through in our youth, or
in our dreams.
18. Nor does it follow from the derivation of instream rights from riparian rights that
any restrictive mutation of riparian rights i.e. correlative rights, applies to federal instream
rights. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the quantity of appurtenant water reserved
is that quantity necessary to accomplish the purpose of the federal reservation. See Cappaert
v. United States supra note 3 and cases cited therein.

